P. K. Edmunds et al v. Kenneth Germer et al : Brief of Plaintiffs and Respondents by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1961
P. K. Edmunds et al v. Kenneth Germer et al : Brief
of Plaintiffs and Respondents
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Wayne C. Durham; Clinton D. Vernon; Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Respondents;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Edmunds v. Germer, No. 9349 (Utah Supreme Court, 1961).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3814
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
:=·I LED 
P. K. EDMUNDS, ELLA M. EDMUNDS, 
CHARLOTTE EDMUNDS, a minor, 
FRANKLIN EDMUNDS, a minor~·""· 
JOHN EDMUNDS, a minor, and ANN:erk : P~~";;.;~. c-~~~ .. -:--u~;zi~ .. ,......_. 
EDMUNDS, a minor, by their guard-
ian ad litem ELLA M. EDMUNDS, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, Case No. 
9349 
vs. 
KENNETH GERMER, JED R. ABBOTT, 
and DAVID R. WALDRON, partners, 
doing business under the firm name of 
GERMER, ABBOTT & WALDRON, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Brief of Plaintiffs and Respondents 
WAYNE C. DURHAM 
CLINTON D. VERNON 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Respondents 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS -------------------------------------------- 1 to 11 
STATEMENT 0 F POINTS -------------------------------------------- 11, 12 
ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 12 
POINT I _______________________ -------------------------------------------------- _______ 12 
DEFENDANTS WERE GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE 
IN NOT WARNING PLAINTIFFS OF THE DAN-
GEROUS CONDITION ON THE ROAD CAUSING 
PLAINTIFFS' INJURIES. 
POINT II _______ ----------------------------------- ____________ ___________ _______________ 2 3 
THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. 
PLAINTIFF P. K. EDMUNDS WAS NOT GUILTY 
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, AS A MATTER 
OF LAW. 
POINT III. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 27 
THE JUDGMENTS ENTERED BELOW WERE NOT 
EXCESSIVE AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
INSTRUCTED THE JURY. 
CONCLUSION ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 28 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
CASES CITED 
Brower v. Moran Paving Co., 58 Utah 349, 199 Pac. 144 __ 14, 19 
Conklin v. Walsh, 113 Utah 276, 193 P.2d 437 ---------------- 25 
Covington v. Carpenter, 4 Utah 2d 378, 294 P.2d 788 ________ 25 
Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Products Co., 80 Utah 331, 
15 p .2d 309 -------------------------------------------------------------------- 26 
Fretz v. Anderson, 5 Utah 2d 290, 300 P.2d 642 ________________ 26 
Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 57 P.2d 708 __________________ 25 
Jewell v. Rogers Township, Mich. 175 NW 151 ______________ 19 
Knox v. Snow, 119 Utah 522, 229 P.2d 874 ------------------------ 25 
Metcalf v. Mellen, 57 Utah 44, 192 Pac. 676 ________ 15, 17, 19 
Nielsen v. Christensen-Gardner, Inc., 85 Utah 79, 
38 p .2d 7 43 ---------------------------------------------------------------- 21-22 
O'Brien v. Alston, 61 Utah 368, 213 Pac. 791 __________________ 22 
Mingus v. Olson, 114 Utah 505, 201 P.2d 495 ----------------- 25 
Scofield v. Sprouse-Reitz Co., 1 Utah 2d 218, 
265 p .2d 396 ------------------------------------------------------------------ 25 
Spackman v. Carson, 117 Utah 390, 216 P .2d 640 ____________ 25 
Toomer's Estate v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 
121 Utah 3 7, 239 P .2d 163 -------------------------------------------- 23 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
58 ALR 2d 86 5, 8 77 ---------------------------------------------------------------- 20 
3 Utah Law Review 198-9 ------------------------------------------------------ 26 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
P. K. EDMUNDS, ELLA M. EDMUNDS, 
CHARLOTTE EDMUNDS, a minor, 
FRANKLIN EDMUNDS, a minor, 
JOHN EDMUNDS, a minor, and ANN 
EDMUNDS, a minor, by their guard-
ian ad litem ELLA M. EDMUNDS, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, Case No. 
vs. 
KENNETH GERMER, JED R. ABBOTT, 
and DAVID R. WALDRON, partners, 
doing business under the firm name of 
GERMER, ABBOTT & WALDRON, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
9349 
Brief of Plaintiffs and Respondents 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As in the brief of defendants and appellants, the same 
designations of the parties will be used herein as were used 
in the trial court. 
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Defendants have appealed from s1x judgments which 
total $16,000 (R. 94-99) entered by the District Court of Iron 
County, March 9, 1960, in accordance with jury verdicts (R. 
88-93), in favor of the six plaintiffs, as follows: 
Dr. P. K. Edmunds --------------------------$11,500 
Mrs. Ella M. Edmunds, wife ________ 2,500 
Charlotte Edmunds, daughter ________ 500 
Franklin Edmunds, son ____________________ 500 
John Edmunds, son -------------------------- 500 
Ann Edmunds, daughter __________________ 500 
Defendants made timely motions for directed verdicts 
at the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence (Tr. 205-8), and at 
the conclusion of their own case (Tr. 313). Defendants also 
made a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdicts 
(R. 104), and a motion for a new trial (R. 102-3). The 
motions were taken under advisement (Tr. 208, 313), were 
subsequently argued on June 8, 1960 (R. 106), and denied 
in a memorandum decision on August 22, 1960 (R. 107). 
The verdicts and judgments were for personal injuries 
and property damage sustained by plaintiffs when an automobile 
driven by Dr. Edmunds, in which his wife, children and a 
guest were passengers, plunged into an unguarded and un-
marked cut in the road (Ex. 5, Tr. 99-101, 164, 176). The 
accident occured between 3:30 and 4:00 o'clock p.m., No-
vember 27, 1955, while Dr. Edmunds, his family and their 
guest were on a Sunday afternoon excursion to inspect farm 
lands owned by Dr. Edmunds on both sides of the highway 
north of Paragonah, Utah (Tr. 95, 186, 216). At the time of 
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flf 
i~ 
the accident work on the highway construction project was tem-
porarily suspended for seasonal reasons (Tr. 202-203, Ex. 15). 
The following facts are undisputed: 
Under a contract between defendants and the State Road 
Commission, executed May 10, 1955, defendants were en-
gaged in constructing approximately 15.511 miles of new 
highway (Ex. 12). The contract also called for the "oblitera-
tion" of 6.625 miles of the old road, including that portion 
of the old road over which Dr. Edmunds was driving at the 
time of the accident (Tr. 202) and for "cuts" in the old road 
to provide drainage (Tr. 221). Part of the contract was a 
set of "Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Con· 
struction (Ex. 12), which in part provided: 
1-4.5 (p. 21): ~~Maintenance of Traffic. Adequate 
signs, flagmen, red lights and barricades shall at all 
time be provided by the Contractor at his own expense 
where traffic is diverted from the existing road or 
where rough road or a dangerous condition exists due 
to construction operations. * * * 
"When construction operations are suspended by 
written order of the Engineer for seasonal conditions 
or other conditions for which the Contractor is not 
responsible, maintenance of the road under traffic, 
including signs, barricades, etc., shall be performed 
by and at the expense of the Commission during the 
period of such suspension. * * * Necessary signs and 
barricades as provided by the contractor shall be left 
in place during the time of suspension." (Emphasis 
added). 
1-7.7 (p. 38): 11Public Convenience and Safety. The 
Contractor shall at all times so conduct his work as to 
insure the least possible obstruction to traffic. The 
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convenience of the general · public and the residents 
along the highway and the protection of persons and 
property are of prime importance and shall be pro-
vided for by the Contractor in an adequate and satis-
factory manner. 
"The Contractor shall maintain a safe and proper 
connection with all intersecting public or private roads 
or driveways, and conduct the work so as to cause no 
unnecessary inconvenience to residents along the road. 
No road shall be closed to the public except by express 
permission of the engineer. * * *" 
1-7.9 (p. 39): rrBarricades and Warning Signs. The 
Contractor shall provide, erect, and maintain all neces-
sary barricades, suitable and sufficient red lights, danger 
signals, and other signs, provide a sufficient number 
of watchmen and take all necessary precautions for 
the protection of the work and the safety of the public. 
Highways closed to traffic shall be protected by effective 
barricades, and obstructions shall be illuminated at 
night. Suitable warning signs, illuminated at night by 
lanterns, flares, or other approved means, shall be 
provided to mark the places where surfacing ends or 
is not compacted or other obstructions. * * * " 
1-7.15 (p. 43): rropening Sections of Project to 
Traffic. At the option of the Engineer, certain sections 
of the work may be inspected, and completed work 
tentatively accepted for the use of traffic. Such accept-
ance shall not constitute final acceptance of the work 
or any part of it or a waiver of any provisions of the 
contract; * * * " 
1-8.9 (p. 51): rrTermination of Contractor} s Re-
sponsibility. The contract will be considered complete 
when all work has been finished, the final inspection 
made by the Engineer, and the project accepted in 
writing by the Commission. The Contractor's respon-
sibility shall then cease, except as set forth in his bond." 
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2-11.1 (p. 79): uobliteration of Old Roads. De-
scription. * * * The obliteration of old roads shall 
consist of appropriate grading of portions of the old 
road that are to be abandoned, and shall include the 
removal or covering of pavements, scarifying, plowing, 
and harrowing all of the areas of the old roadway as 
directed. 
2-11.2 (p. 79: uconstruction Methods. After the old 
road is no longer needed for traffic, the existing oil 
or gravel surfacing shall be bladed into ditches, borrow 
pits, or alongside the embankment and covered with 
earth; * * * After the above work is completed, the 
area of the old road surfacing shall be scarified or 
plowed to mix effectively the remaining material with 
the earth. * * * " 
The "cut" in the old road into which the Edmunds' car 
plunged was within the project covered by the contract and 
was made by defendants pursuant to the contract to provide 
for drainage of the area between the old and the new high-
ways (Tr. 198). There is no dispute that the "cut" in question 
was made by defendants prior to the time-November 19, 
1955 - when further work was suspended for seasonal 
reasons. 
Defendants acknowledge that the contract required them 
to "substantially obliterate the old road" (Tr. 199, 308) and 
it is undisputed that the scarifying, or tearing up, of the old 
road did not take place until work was resumed in June, 
1956 (Tr. 202, 247, 254). It is submitted that there is no 
dispute as to the condition of the old road at the time of the 
accident. Patrolman Reed testified that it was "travelled, 
polished" oil, and that it was in better condition than shown 
in the pictures which were taken 6 weeks later and which are 
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Exhibits 2 to 5, inclusive (Tr. 26, 32-33). Mr. Silas Morrell, 
defendants' superintendent of construction on this project, in 
response to a question as to whether the old road was in good 
condition on the day of the accident, answered, "Yes, it was 
passable, sure" (Tr. 290). Mrs. Edmunds testified that the 
"old road was a good highway. It was clear, no debris" (Tr. 
187). 
We believe it is undisputed that on the day of the accident 
-November 27, 1955-Dr. Edmunds, his wife and children 
and a guest, decided to go for a drive to inspect farm property 
owned by Dr. Edmunds lying along the east and west sides 
of the old and new highways near the south end of the con-
struction project. They drove north from Cedar City to the 
south end of the project where the old and new highways 
joined. Dr. Edmunds drove north along the new highway to 
a point near the north end of his property. After briefly 
inspecting his property at that point they then crossed over 
to the old highway by an access road to look over his property 
along the west side of the old road right of way. After in-
specting the property, and possibly after stopping to look at 
some flowing wells from a distance, Dr. Edmunds drove the car 
south along the old road. As he approached the south end of 
the project, where the old and new roads joined, he suddenly 
saw the "cut" in the road and before he could stop, the auto-
mobile plunged into the excavation. (See testimony of Dr. 
Edmunds T r. 94-99) . 
Another undisputed fact is that there were no warning 
signs, barricades, or markers of any kind at or near the cut 
in the old road into which the Edmunds' automobile plunged 
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or at any of the approach roads leading from the new road 
to the old road (Tr. 89, 218-19; defendants' brief, page 13). 
It is also undisputed that there was no warning sign or 
barricade between the south end of the project and Lunt 
Memorial Park, a distance of about 5 miles (Tr. 289, 265, Ex. 
19). 
The principal questions about which there is some conflict 
m the testimony are: 
1. Whether there was a barricade across the old 
road where it and the new highway joined at the south 
end of the project on the day of the accident. 
2. Whether the cuts in the old road between the 
north point of Dr. Edmunds' property and the scene 
of the accident were made prior to or subsequent to the 
day of the accident. 
3. Whether a cut in the old road south of the scene 
of the accident and north of a road connecting the new 
and old roads was made prior to or subsequent to the 
accident. 
As to whether there was a signed barricade across the 
old road at its junction with the new highway on the south 
end the testimony may be summarized as follows: Sgt. Reed 
testified there was a "sawhorse effect sign saying 'Detour' or 
'Road Closed,' he was not certain which, that did not com-
pletely block off the highway,'' and that there were "tracks 
evident on both sides that you could go around it'' (Tr. 39); 
Dr. Edmunds testified that he saw no warning signs or barri-
cades indicating that the old highway was not open to traffic 
( Tr. 113-14, 151) ; Mr. Hiatt, who drove the wrecker which 
removed the Edmunds' car after the accident, testified he 
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did not recall seeing any warning signs and that there ''were 
no barricades near where the car plunged in," that when he 
got Dr. Edmunds' car up on the roadway he "proceeded out 
the old road to somewhere where they came together, or near 
that point, gained access to the new road and on to Cedar," 
and that he did "recall going out the old highway" (Tr. 89-91); 
defendants' witness Claude Kemp Savage, who was driving 
south on the new road at the time of the accident, testified 
that he saw a barricade at the north end of the project on the 
day of the accident (some 12-15 miles north of the scene 
of the accident) but that he did not recall seeing any barri-
cades, equipment or fences across the old road at the south 
end (Tr. 210-11, 218-19); defendants' witness Ben Lee, resi-
dent engineer, testified that there were barricades at both the 
north and south ends of the project (Tr. 231) but that "on 
the north we went in for more elaborate signing, because we, 
again, detoured from the new road over to the old road" 
(Tr. 232) and that some complaint about the signing at the 
north end was "another reason for the elaborate signing, was 
on the north end there. We didn't have it adequately signed" 
(Tr. 243); that at the south end "There was a barricade there 
at the time we turned the contractor loose. I mean, we shut 
him down for the winter" (Tr. 224), and that for two hundred 
feet they took out the old highway completely in order to get 
material to use on the new highway (Tr. 224-25); Mr. Silas 
Morrell, defendants· superintendent of construction, testified 
that they had placed 16-foot standard barricaded signs at the 
south end (Tr. 264-65) but that the signs could have been 
destroyed between the time work was suspended (November 
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With reference to the importance of the question whether 
cuts in the old road to the north of the scene of the accident 
were made prior to or subsequent to the accident defendants 
seem to take contradictory positions. At page 3 of their State-
ment of Facts they state that they "regard his question as of 
small consequence in view of the uncontradicted fact that 
Edmunds drove on this old road for some distance before 
driving into one of these cuts." Despite this statement be-
littling the importance of the question, defendants repeatedly 
refer to the cuts throughout their Statement of Facts and the 
Argument as though it was clearly established the cuts had 
been made on the day of the accident. On page 2 of their 
brief they state that the "old section of highway had been cut 
in 20 places * * * and was fenced off at various points through-
out its length at six places, so that it was no longer useable 
for travel," implying that such was the condition of the road 
at the time of the accident. On page 5 of their brief, they 
refer to the warning of the "cuts in the old road" and make 
the bald statement (which the record does not support) that 
by the time work was suspended "all of the work on the project 
covered by the contract had been completed, with the exception 
of the scarification of the surface of the old road." On page 
8 they state that "all of the cuts were readily discernible to 
anyone travelling on the new road," again implying that they 
had all been made by the day of the accident and ignoring the 
irrelevancy of cuts made many miles from the scene of the 
accident. On pages 9, 14, 15, 17, 22, 32 and 33 of their brief 
defendants lean heavily upon the contention that the old 
road had been cut in 20 places. 
In addition to the irrelevancy of cuts, fences, barricades 
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and signs at the north end of the project, or at any point north 
of the area travelled by Dr. Edmunds on the day of the accident, 
we call particular attention to Exhibits 2, 3, 4 and 5, which, 
we believe, completely demolish the contentions, upon which 
defendants rely so heavily, that all 20 of the cuts including 
the three to six cuts in that part of the old road traveled by 
Dr. Edmunds (Tr. 289, 297, 300, 222, 229, 234-35 256-57) 
were made prior to suspension of work and prior to the time 
of the accident. Exhibits 2, 3, 4 and 5, taken 6 weeks after 
the accident at points between the north end of Dr. Edmunds' 
property and the cut into which his car plunged show clearly 
that in January, 1956, there were no other cuts in the road I J 
and that there were no barricades or warning signs. Besides 
these exhibits, the testimony of Dr. Edmunds and that of his 
wife (Tr. 113, 176, 179, 184-88) that they travelled the old 
1 
1 
road for about one and three-eighths miles before encountering 
the cut into which their car plunged, is uncontradicted. More-
over, defendants' witness Claude Kemp Savage testified that he 
saw the Edmunds' ~ar traveling on the old road for from 1V2 to 
2 blocks before it plunged into the open cut (Tr. 214). We 
submit that Exhibits 2, 3, 4 and 5, and the supporting testimony 
of Dr. and Mrs. Edmunds and of Mr. Savage clearly establish 
that the old road for a distance of at least one and three-eighths 
miles north of the scene of the accident had not been cut on 
November 27, 1955, and that Mr. Morrell and Mr. Lee were in 
error when they testified that that stretch of the old road had 
been cut prior to the accident. 
That Mr. Lee and Mr. Morrell were in error when they 
testified that no cuts in the old road were made after the 
accident is also established by the testimony of Mr. Homer 
10 
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Jones, the photographer, and by Exhibit 5. The latter is a 
photograph of the cut into which the Edmunds' automobile 
plunged and it shows Mr. Jones' car on the old road near the 
south edge of the cut. Mr. Jones testified that the car was 
driven there by way of a road connecting the old and new 
roads south of the accident scene (Tr. 84-86). At the time 
of the trial, however, there was a cut in the old road between 
the one where the accident occured and the connecting road 
to the south. It is obvious, of course, that Mr. Jones' car could 
not possibly have been driven over the connecting road and 
then north up the old road to the south edge of the cut shown 
in Exhibit 5 if the other cut had been made in the old road 
prior to the accident. 
We submit that the evidence clearly establishes that at 
least one cut south of the scene of the accident and from three 
to six cuts to the north were all made after resumption of 
work on the project in June, 1956. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANTS WERE GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE IN 
NOT WARNING PLAINTIFFS OF THE DANGEROUS 
CONDITION ON THE ROAD CAUSING PLAINTIFFS' 
INJURIES. 
POINT II. 
THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. PLAIN-
11 
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TIFF P. K. EDMUNDS WAS NOT GUILTY OF CON-
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
POINT III. 
THE JUDGMENTS ENTERED BELOW WERE NOT 
EXCESSIVE AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY IN-
STRUCTED THE JURY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANTS WERE GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE IN 
NOT WARNING PLAINTIFFS OF THE DANGEROUS 
CONDITION ON THE ROAD CAUSING PLAINTIFFS' 
INJURIES. 
Although defendants contend they had no duty with 
respect to Dr. and Mrs. Edmunds and their children to do 
anything more than they did, the jury and the trial court con-
cluded otherwise. Even granting, which we do only for the 
sake of argument, that there was some sort of sign at the sou~ 
end of the constructon project (which is one of the disputed 
issues of the case), there is no dispute whatsoever (see first 
full sentence on page 13 of defendants' brief) that there was 
no sign, barricade or warning of any kind at the cut in the 
road into which the Edmunds car plunged or on any of the 
access roads. The only thing that even the defendants contend 
was done (which we do not concede was done) to warn 
persons approaching from the south was the erection of some 
12 
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kind of sign at the junction of the new and old highways. 
At the cut in the old road there was no warning of any kind. 
There was no warning on any of the access roads either where 
they took off from the new highway or where they crossed 
the old highway. 
Much was said at the trial, and much is said in defendants' 
brief about the "more elaborate" signs at the north end of 
the project (Tr. 232) some 12 miles north of the scene of 
the accident. There had been some complaints as to the ade-
quacy of the signs at the north end. Resident Engineer Lee 
testified: "That was another reason for the elaborate signing, 
was on the north end there. We didn't have it adequately 
signed" (Tr. 243). But Dr. Edmunds and his family didn't 
get within 10 miles of the "more elaborate" signs at the north 
end of the project. Like defendants' argument that they had 
done everything necessary to complete the new highway, their 
arguments about the character and sufficiency of the signs 
at the north end are meaningless. The accident happened on 
the old road, not on the new road, near the south end of the 
project, not near the north end. Dr. Edmunds and his family 
approached the area from the south and didn't travel more 
than about 11;2 miles on the new highway before they turned 
west and, using one of the access roads, crossed over to the 
west side of the right-of-way to inspect lands owned by Dr. 
Edmunds. 
As previously indicated, plaintiffs dispute the claim of 
defendants that a sign was placed across part of the old road 
at the junction of it and the new highway. Dr. Edmunds did 
not recall seeing such a sign ( T r. 113-114, 151) . Defendants' 
witness Claude Kemp Savage testified he saw a barricade at 
13 
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the north end of the project but that he did not recall seeing 
any barricades, equipment or fences across the old road at 
the south end (Tr. 210, 218-19). The driver of the wrecker 
which was used to remove Dr. Edmunds' car from the cut 
testified he did not recall seeing any warning signs and that 
there "were no barricades near where the car plunged in" 
and that when he got Dr. Edmunds' car out of the cut he 
"proceeded out the old road to somewhere where they came 
together, or near that point, gained access to the new road 
and on to Cedar" ( T r. 89-90) . While Sgt. Reed, of the High-
way Patrol, testified that there was a "sawhorse effect sign" 
at the south end of the old road, he also testified that it did 1 ' 
not completley block off the highway and that "there was 
tracks evident on both sides that you could go around it" 
(Tr. 39). 
In Brower v. Moran Paving Co., 58 Utah 349, 199 Pac. 
144, a passenger brought suit against a highway contractor 
and recovered for in juries received when the automobile ran 
into a trench in the street, only part of which was barricaded. 
The court stated: 
"Barriers erected to prevent danger to travelers or 
warn the public of the dangerous condition of a street 
must be at least reasonably sufficient for that purpose. 
In the present case it was a question for the jury's 
decision as to whether the trestle was sufficient in 
length, and as to whether it was negligence to have 
from 18 to 30 feet of the trench without a barrier or 
guard of any kind. 
·'Whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence is not free from substantial doubt. The question 
of contributory negligence was for the jury and not 
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for the court to decide, because different minds might 
reasonably arrive at different conclusions as to whether 
plaintiff was culpably negligent. 
"We think the issues were properly submitted to the 
jury, and that the court committed no abuse of dis-
cretion in overruling appellant's motion for a new 
trial. The judgment is therefore affirmed, with costs." 
Metcalf v. Mellen, 57 Utah 44, 192 Pac. 676, was an 
appeal from a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, who was 
the driver and owner of an automobile and was brought 
against a state road contractor who left unguarded, unlighted 
and unbarricaded an excavation in a state highway into which 
the plaintiff drove his automobile. As in the instant case, the 
contractor had "agreed and covenanted with the state road 
commission of the State of Utah to erect and maintain good 
and sufficient guards, baricades, and signals * * * to protect 
the public from any dangerous condition arising out of or inci-
dental to said improvement of said street." The court affirmed 
the lower court's judgment on the jury verdict, and said: 
"It is not necessary to review the evidence. It is 
sufficient to say that plaintiff's evidence fully justified 
the court in submitting each cause of action to the 
jury, and that the evidence on the principal issues was 
conflicting. 
* * * 
"Except those of New Jersey, the courts have held 
that such contracts inure to the benefit of any one 
of the public who is injured by the negligent failure 
of the contractor to take those precautions which he 
agreed to take for the protection of the public. The 
contract is a measure of the contractor's duty. If he 
assumes a responsibility broader than that of his com-
15 
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mon law liability for negligence, he becomes liable for 
torts arising out of a breach of such duty which are 
the proximate cause of injury to third persons. 
* * * 
"In light of the above authorities, and upon principle, 
we conclude that a case was stated and proved against 
appellant, based upon his common-law liability for 
negligence, and also upon the tort arising from the 
breach of the contract, in which he assumed duties 
and obligations that he has no right to repudiate when 
his negligent failure to comply with and observe them 
has resulted in injury and damage to the property of 
respondent and that of his assignors." (Emphasis 
supplied). 
We submit that defendants failed to perform both their 
common law duty to plaintiffs and the duty they assumed under 
provisions of the contract pursuant to which the road project 
was being constructed. Under common law principles defend-
ants owed a duty to plaintiffs to warn them of the dangerous 
condition defendants had created on the old road. This they 
neglected to do. They neglected to place any warning sign or 
barricade on the old road near the cut or on any of the access 
roads where they crossed or intersected the old road. Plaintiffs 
were fully within their rights in traveling north along the 
new highway to the north end of Dr. Edmunds' property and 
in using the access road to drive west from the new highway 
to the old road to view his property to the west of the right-
of-way. It was the natural and normal thing for Dr. Edmunds 
to do to turn south from the access road and travel along the 
so-called old road-a polished, travelled oiled highway in 
good condition (Tr. 26, 32-33, 290). One sign or barricade 
at the cut or at the intersection of the old road and the nearest 
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access road would have warned plaintiffs of the dangerous 
condition. But defendants neglected to put up such a sign 
or barricade, and left an open, unguarded cut in the road. 
As part of their contract with the State of Utah, defend-
ants agreed (Ex. 12) in part, as follows: 
~~Maintenance of Traffic. Adequate signs, flagmen, 
red lights and barricades shall at all time be provided 
by the Contractor at his own expense where traffic is 
diverted from the existing road or where rough road 
or a dangerous condition exists due to construction 
operations. * * * (Ex. 12, p. 21, 1-4.5). 
rrBarricades and Warning Signs. The Contractor 
shall provide, erect, and maintain all necessary barri-
cades, suitable and sufficient red lights, danger signals, 
and other signs, provide a sufficient number of watch-
men and take all necessary precautions for the protec-
tion of the work and the safety of the public. High-
ways closed to traffic shall be protected by effective 
barricades, and obstructions shall be illuminated at 
night. Suitable warning signs, illuminated at night by 
lanterns, flares, or other approved means, shall be 
provided to mark the places where surfacing ends or is 
not compacted or other obstructions. * * * " (Ex. 12, 
p. 39, 1-7.9). 
Part of the "measure of the contractor's duty" * * * that 
"inure ( s) to the benefit of any one of the public who is 
injured" (see Metcalf v. Mellen, supra), was for defendants 
to provide rr adequate signs * * * where * * * a dangerous 
condition exists due to construction operations" and rr effective 
barricades" where "(H) ighways (are) closed to traffic," as 
well as to "take all necessary precautions * * * for the safety 
of the public," including but not limited to "suitable warning 
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signs * * * to mark the places where surfacing ends." These 
duties were not properly discharged in this case by defendants. 
Throughout their brief defendants make repeated refer-
ences to 20 cuts in the old road along the length of the project; 
to fences in six places; and, continually assert that the old 
highway had been abandoned. We submit that the cuts in 
the old highway north of the scene of the accident as far as 
the north end of Dr. Edmunds' property, clearly were made 
after the accident. We also submit that the record just as 
plainly establishes that one cut south of the accident location 
was made subsequent to November 27, 1955. The fences, like 
the "more elaborate signing" at the north end of the project, 
relate to areas far removed from the scene of the accident. 
In asserting that the old road had been abandoned, defendants 
overlook two express provisions in their contract. In Section 
1-7.7 of the Standard Specifications (Ex. 12) it is provided 
that "No road shall be closed to the public except by express 
permission of the engineer." The record does not disclose 
that permissoin was given to close and abandon the old road 
prior to the day of the accident. Section 1-8.9 (Ex. 12) provides 
that the "contract will be considered complete when all work 
has been finished, the final inspection made by the Engineer, 
and the project accepted in writing by the Commission" and 
that the "Contractor's responsibility shall then cease" (emphasis 
added). This project was not accepted, and the contractor's 
liability did not cease, until after the work was completed in 
the spring of 1956. 
Even if the old road had been abandoned on the 
date of the accident, which plaintiffs deny, the Michigan court 
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m Jewell v. Rogers Township, 175 N.W. 151, held that 
where a road had been closed and destroyed at one point by 
the erection of a quarry, the legal duty existed to exclude 
public travel by signs and barriers that would plainly warn 
travelers of the danger. 
There can be no question that the issue as to whether 
or not the defendants violated their duty to the Edmunds 
family on that November Sunday, 1955, was a question for 
the jury. As in Brower v. Moran Paving Co., supra, and 
lvletcalf v. Mellen, supra, it was a jury question whether the 
alleged sign at the south end of the project, and defendants' 
failure to erect any other sign, warning or barricade of any 
kind, adequately discharged defendants' duty to Dr. Edmunds 
and his family. Any speculation by the defendants that their 
duty to warn these plaintiffs of the peril created by defendants' 
construction of the drainage excavation would be burdensome 
or unreasonable because of the numerous cuts (which actually 
did not exist in November, 1955), and numerous access roads, 
required to be constructed by the contract, must be considered 
for just what it is: speculation. The duty of the defendants 
to provide effective barricades, danger signals and other signs 
is clear under the cases as well as under the contract. 
Defendants next claim that they were relieved from lia-
bility to plaintiffs Edmunds because work on the project was 
suspended eight days before the plaintiffs were injured due 
to seasonal conditions (Ex. 15). In support of their position 
defendants recite from Section 1-4.5 of the Standard Speci-
fications (Ex. 12, p. 21-22; defendants' brief, p. 19) which 
provides, in part, "When construction operations are sus-' 
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pended * * * for which the contractor is not responsible, 
maintenance of the road under traffic including signs and 
barricades, etc., shall be performed by and at the expense 
of the Commission during the period of suspension * * * 
necessary signs and barricades as provided by the contractor 
shall be left in place during the time of suspension." (Ex. 
12, Standard Specifications). Completely ignoring the plain 
language just quoted that, in the event of suspension, the Com-
mission shall only be responsible for "maintenance" of the 
project as left by the contractors, defendants nevertheless 
allege that the Commission thereafter had the duty to rr provide 
and maintain" any necessary safety devices. The defendants 
also apparently do not recognize that the Commission's duty 
of rrmaintenance" did not apply to the old road where the 
plaintiffs were injured, but refers only to the new road which 
was the rrroad under traffic." The quoted provision further 
emphasizes that it was the defendants' duty to provide signs, 
warnings and barricades on the old road as well as the new 
road, during the period of suspension. 
Finally, defendants urge that the placing traffic on the 
new portion of U. S. 91 constituted practical acceptance of 
the project not requiring formal acceptance as specified in 
the contract. Obviously this doctrine has no application to 
the facts of this case, first, because the plaintiffs were not 
injured on the completed portion of the project, namely, the 
new highway; second, because work on the old section of the 
highway where the accident occurred was not completed as 
to required drainage cuts, scarifying and obliteration; and, 
third, because (as recognized in the annotation cited by de-
fendants, 58 ALR 2d 865 at page 877) the doctrine that 
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practical acceptance obviates the need of actual acceptance 
may be modified by contract. Sec. 1-7.15 of the Standard Speci-
fications at page 43 (Ex. 12) provides: that although portions 
of the work may be tentatively accepted for the use of traffic, 
''such acceptance shall not constitute final acceptance of the 
work or any part of it or a waiver of any provision of the 
wntract; * * * " (emphasis added). See also page 51 of the 
Standard Specifications, Sec. 1-8.9, ~~Termination of Contrac-
tor's Responsibility" set forth in the Statement of Facts herein. 
Inasmuch as it is apparent that defendants failed in their 
duty to adequately warn plaintiffs of the dangerous excavation, 
defendants cannot successfully contend that Dr. Edmunds' 
conduct was the sole proximate cause of the injuries sustained 
by plaintiffs. The cases relied upon by defendants demonstrate 
clearly that the claim of defendants is untenable under the 
facts of the case. Nielsen v. Christensen-Gardner, Inc., 85 
Utah 79, 38 P.2d 743, is readily distinguished from the instant 
case, because the highway contractor there fully discharged 
his duty to warn travelers by maintaininga barricade at the 
excavation six feet tall and 18 feet wide with two lighted 
red lanterns which the driver testified he saw 600 feet away. 
At page 746 of 38 P.2d the court quotes 7 McQuillin, Municipal 
Corps. 216, as follows: 
"The question as to the sufficiency of the guard or 
warning is not susceptible of a precise answer. The 
test is whether the means employed are reasonably 
sufficient for the purpose intended, namely, to protect 
travelers; and it may be added that the question of 
sufficiency is generally one of fact for the jury, al-
though in particular cases barriers may be held sufficient 
or insufficient as a matter of law." 
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The Nielsen case also quotes the general rule stated in Thomas 
v. City of Lexington, 168 Miss. 107, 150 So. 816, 817: 
"As a general rule, the question as to whether or 
not signals or warnings against existing defects in a 
street are sufficient is one for the determination of the 
jury. Such is the case where the evidence is conflicting, 
or is such that reasonable minds might arrive at differ-
ent conclusions; but where the evidence is undisputed 
and only the inference of negligence can be drawn 
from the proven facts as to the nature or character 
of the signals or barriers erected as a warning of a 
defective or dangerous condition in a street, the ques-
tion of negligence in respect to the particular defect 
or obstruction or warning signal is one for the court." 
The Utah court then concludes that under the facts the trial 
court should have withheld the case from the jury and directed 
a verdict contrary to the general rule which was not applicable. 
O'Brien v. Alston, 61 Utah 368, 213 Pac. 791, is another 
case where the defend~t highway contractor had not failed 
to adequately warn users of the highway of the danger, but 
had erected a proper barricade at the point of danger. The 
facts of the 0' Brien case are not similar to those before the 
court now. 
Clearly the defendants owed the Edmunds family the 
duty to erect some sign, warning or barricade on the old 
portion of the highway at or near the drainage excavation, 
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POINT II. 
THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. PLAIN-
TIFF P. K. EDMUNDS WAS NOT GUILTY OF CON-
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The jury having found the issues in favor of plaintiffs, 
the latter are entitled to have all of the evidence, and every 
inference and intendment fairly arising therefrom construed 
in the light most favorable to them. This is particularly true 
as to the question of contributory negligence. See Toomer's 
Estate v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 121 Utah 37, 239 P. 2d 
163. Dr. Edmunds described the accident as follows: 
" * * * We were traveling along the old highway, 
which was gray, a light color in contrast to the new 
highway, which was black, and about every quarter 
mile there was a strip of black coating across the gray-
old highway to the new highway. * * * And at every 
quarter mile that was visible to us. And, I think, it 
must have been accentuated by the fact it had been 
wet, because it had been recently raining. * * * 
"But the blacktop, as most people have observed, 
looks blacker when it's wet; and, as I recall, these 
strips that had crossed the old-gray highway, old 91, 
were quite dark, and then, oh approximately, oh three-
eights of a mile, I would estimate, more or less, beyond 
the southern extent of our property one of these ap-
parent road strips across the old highway turned out 
to be a cut in the road. But it was marvelously decep-
tive. It looked just exactly like these strips across the 
highway. And we were on top of it before I could 
discern the difference and see that it was a cut in the 
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Mrs. Edmunds testified similarly as to the deceptive 
appeatance of the excavation (Tr. 176, 186-188). The inves-
tigating officer stated that the Edmunds car made two heavy 
skid marks for approximately 50 feet (Tr. 27). Photographs 
of the old roadway (Ex. 2-5) are especially helpful in visualiz-
ing this situation inasmuch as they were taken at a height 
equivalent to that of the driver of an automobile and were 
taken in sequence progressively closer to the cut (Tr. 100). 
The jury was permitted to view the accident scene (Tr. 311-12) 
and was in possession of all available facts. 
Defendants' witness Morrell testified that at the time of 
the trial (about 4V2 years after the accident) the cut into which 
Dr. Edmunds' car plunged was 27 feet across and 4V2 feet 
deep (Tr. 262). Dr. Edmunds estimated the cut was "ap-
proximately ten to twelve feet across" and from "two and a half 
to maybe three feet" deep (Tr. 101). No doubt the plunging 
of Dr. Edmunds' car into the cut and the hauling of it out 
could have broken down the edges and widened the cut. 
In this connection the testimony of Sgt. Reed is ·interesting. 
At page 33 of the Transcript Sgt. Reed, in testifying as to 
Exhibit No. 5, the .photograph of the cut into which the car 
plunged, taken 6 weeks after the accident, said: 
"Well, these look like equipment ruts and tractor 
ruts (indicating) that were not there at that time. This 
oil was traveled, polished, and this debris and so on 
that is shown here was not there at that time." 
Previously in his testimony, at page 32 of the Transcript, he 
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"They are a fair representation of the area, but the 
oil on it had been torn up considerably; in worse shape 
that it was on the old road." 
The testimony of Sgt. Reed could be the explanation for 
the differences in estimates as to the width of the cut and 
its depth. It would not take many trips by heavy equipment, 
such as tractors, over the edges of the cut to considerably widen 
the gap. His testimony clearly indicates, also, that after the 
accident, and within a period of 6 weeks, there was sufficient 
travel of vehicles of some sort along the old road so that 
the "oil on it * * * (was) torn up considerably." 
All of the cases cited by defendants are to be distinguished 
on their facts. Some involve pedestrians who had time to 
prevent their injuries as in Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 
57 P. 2d 708; Mingus v. Olson, 114 Utah 505, 201 P. 2d 495 
(crossing busy street without looking) -trial court directed 
verdict; Scofield v. Sprouse-Reitz Co., 1 Utah 2d 218, 265 
P 2d 396 (fall down stairs); Knox v. Snow, 119 Utah 522, 
229 P 2d 8 7 4 (fall into service station grease pit) . The 
others involve collisions between two motor vehicles-Coving-
ton v. Carpenter, 4 Utah 2d 3 78, 294 P 2d 788 (directed 
verdict for defendant affirmed); Spackman v. Carson, 117 
Utah 390, 216 P 2d 640, (jury determined no contributory 
negligence, affirmed) ; and Conklin v. Walsh, 113 Utah 2 7 6, 
193 P 2d 43 7 (intersection collision). None of the authorities 
cited by defendants has direct application. 
The automobile headlight cases involving the duty of the 
driver to stop his car within "the assured clear distance," 
although not directly in point, are persuasive in the instant 
case. The earlier cases were prone to find the existence of 
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contributory negligence as a matter of law. (See Dalley v. 
l\1id-Wesetrn Dairy Products Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 P 2d 309, 
and 3 Utah Law Review 198-9, subdivision entitled "Negli-
gence and Assured Clear Distance.") Later cases, as stated 
in Fretz v. Anderson, 5 Utah 2d 290, 300 P 2d 642, have 
allowed the jury "to determine, in the light of existing con-
ditions, what a reasonable and prudent person would do under 
the circumstances. Moss v. Christensen-Gardner, Inc., 98 Utah 
2 53, 98 P 2d 363 (an accumulation of smoke and mist in 
addition to sudden glare from the lights of an approaching 
automobile; Nielsen v. Watanabe, 90 Utah 401, 62 P 2d 117 
(sudden blinking lights); Trimble v. Union Pacific Stages, 
105 Utah 457, 142 P 2d 674 (fog); Hodges v. Waite, 2 Utah 
2d 152, 270 P 2d 461 (curve in road obscuring the obstruc-
tion)." 
Without pausing, the opinion in the Fretz case continues: 
"Appellant reads these later cases as indicating that 
the only conditions which may be considered by the 
jury are those which occur so suddenly and without 
warning that the motorist has no opportunity to stop 
his vericle. However, as respondent points out, neither 
the fog in the Trimble case nor the curve in the Hodges 
case were unforeseeable, and in those cases the motor-
ist was not required to stop but merely to exercise 
more than the ordinary amount of care. 
" * * * The jury determined that her (plaintiff's) 
conduct was reasonable under the circumstances and 
we feel that the law lays no heavier duty l!POn her." 
The evidence in this case is that Dr. Edmunds had no 
warning of any kind, and that existence of the excavation was 
not foreseeable. Certainly under all of the existing conditions 
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the issue of contributory negligence was properly submitted 
to the jury and should not be disturbed on appeal. 
POINT III. 
THE JUDGMENTS ENTERED BELOW WERE NOT 
EXCESSIVE AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY IN-
STRUCTED THE JURY. 
That the minor plaintiffs were substantially damaged is 
attested by the testimony of their mother and guardian ad 
litem, who described their cuts, bruises and fright (Tr. 182-3, 
189, 192-3). Dr. Edmunds testified that he treated his children 
as their physician and described their contusions, abrasions 
and wounds (Tr. 126-7). The item of fright alone, without 
other injury, would more than justify the nominal verdicts 
of $500. 
Plaintiff Ella M. Edmunds received substantial injuries 
to her head, lower back, left ankle (Tr. 177, 179-181) re-
quiring X-rays (Tr. 126, 179). Mrs. Edmunds testified: 
" * * * in falling I must have hit the back of my head 
and broke the windshield, and I must have turned, 
because I twisted my ankle and also hit the hump (in 
the floor of the car), I imagine, and hurt my back, the 
lower spine." (Tr. 177). 
Mrs. Edmunds, a registered nurse (Tr. 179), testified that 
the bump on her head created a lump about the size of a big 
"double yolked egg" (Tr. 177). Dr. Edmunds stated that a 
blow on the head like his wife received always results in a 
concussion of the brain (Tr. 126). 
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Defendants also complain the trial court committed error 
in giving instructions that refer to the scene of the accident 
as a "roadway." That this term could not be too objectionable 
is indicated by the defendants' use of it themselves in their 
requested instructions No. 20, 21 and 22. This argument of 
defendants is based upon the disputed existence of 20 cuts, 
the fencing, and the obliteration which have been thoroughly 
discussed and disposed of earlier in this brief. There was no 
error in the trial court's instructions occasioned by use of 
the term "roadway." Nor was there any error in Instruction 
No. 12, which stated that defendants had the duty to use 
reasonable care to exclude public travel through adequate signs 
and barricades, etc. Instruction No. 5 defines "ordinary care," 
and Instruction No. 4 refers to "ordinary and reasonable care" 
and there was no error committed in the instructions given by 
the court. 
Finally, plaintiffs submit that no error was committed 
by the trial court not giving instructions requested by de-
fendants. The substance of defendants' requested Instruction 
No. 7 concerning the duty of Mrs. Edmunds to keep a lookout 
was adequately covered in the court's Instruction No. 14. The 
other requested instructions of defendants were either not 
proper or were otherwise adequately covered in the court's 
Instructions. The merits of the contents of requested instruc-
tions Nos. 15, 19, 20 and 21 have been adequately covered 
under Point I of this brief. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs and respondents submit that, under the facts 
of this case and the authorities above cited, the judgments of 
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the trial court entered on the jury's verdicts were properly 
entered, and should, therefore, be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WAYNE C. DURHAM 
CLINTON D. VERNON 
431 American Oil Building 
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